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Payment and Pricing Decisions in Health Care Reform 
Abstract 
Any effort to reform health insurance in the United States must tackle the prices we pay for health care. 
There are many complex challenges to addressing prices. Some proposals build on the existing Medicare 
fee schedule, while others suggest promoting alternative payment mechanisms—or even starting from 
scratch. The stakes are substantial, as many reform proposals rely on reining in prices to achieve the 
savings necessary to expand health insurance to the uninsured. At Penn’s LDI Medicare for All and 
Beyond conference, a panel of researchers, hospital administrators, and policy experts considered issues 
related to health care payment and pricing that any health care reform proposal must address, including 
the implications of rate setting for providers and patients. At what level should these rates be set to 
assure access and quality of care, while incentivizing innovation and rewarding excellence? 
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EDITOR’S NOTE
The financial strain on health systems and providers during the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the 
fragility of our current payment and pricing models. In February 2020, Penn’s Leonard Davis Institute of 
Health Economics (LDI) held a conference, Medicare for All and Beyond: Expanding Coverage, Containing 
Costs, which included a panel discussion on payment and pricing.1 Public and private insurers pay strikingly 
different prices for the same services; one study estimated that commercial health insurers pay nearly 4-5 
times as much as Medicare and Medicaid for the kinds of care COVID-19 patients require.2 The broader 
issue of payment and pricing will figure heavily in upcoming health care reform debates, and is central to 
the affordability and sustainability of any proposal.
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PAYMENT AND PRICING DECISIONS  
IN HEALTH CARE REFORM 
Rate setting, cost control, and public option proposals
INTRODUCTION 
Any effort to reform health insurance in the United States must tackle 
the prices we pay for health care. High prices for drugs, hospital beds, 
and physician services in the private insurance market have resulted 
in family premiums that average $20,576 a year and out-of-pocket 
costs that can pose a financial barrier to getting needed care.3 There 
are many complex challenges to addressing prices. Some proposals 
build on the existing Medicare fee schedule, while others suggest 
promoting alternative payment mechanisms—or even starting from 
scratch. The stakes are substantial, as many reform proposals rely on 
reining in prices to achieve the savings necessary to expand health 
insurance to the uninsured.
At Penn’s LDI Medicare for All and Beyond conference, a panel of 
researchers, hospital administrators, and policy experts considered 
issues related to health care payment and pricing that any health 
care reform proposal must address, including the implications of rate 
setting for providers and patients.1 At what level should these rates be 
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BACKGROUND:  
The Current Payment Landscape
The U.S. insurance market has three main payers: Medicare (financed 
by the federal government), Medicaid (financed by states and 
the federal government), and private health insurance (funded by 
premiums charged to businesses and households). Overall, Medicare 
and Medicaid account for 49.4% of all health insurance payments, a 
share that has slowly risen over time.4 
Because public payers generally cover higher-cost populations (elderly, 
disabled, and low-income individuals with complicated social needs), 
per-person annual spending is much higher in Medicare ($12,784) and 
Medicaid ($8,201, excluding CHIP) than in private health insurance 
($6,199).4 But Medicare and Medicaid have been more successful than 
private insurers in limiting the growth of spending for their enrollees. 
Since 2008, spending per enrollee has increased the most in employer-
sponsored insurance (46.4%), followed by Medicare (21.5%), and 
Medicaid (12.5%).5 In 2018, for example, per-enrollee spending grew by 
6.7% for private insurers, compared to 3.7% and 2.0% for Medicare and 
Medicaid, respectively.6 So, if the privately insured population tends 
to be younger and healthier, what is driving the surge in spending? In 
short, it is payment and pricing. 
DIVERGING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RATES 
Across nearly all services, public programs like Medicare pay,  
on average, substantially less than private insurers. A recent  
literature review found that private insurers pay roughly double 
Medicare rates for hospital services and 40% above Medicare rates 
for physician services.7 Private prices vary tremendously by hospital, 
with one study finding that negotiated prices are from 150% to 400% 
higher than Medicare rates across different health systems.8 
Why are private payment rates so much higher than public ones? 
Many policymakers cite the increasing consolidation of hospitals, 
which decreases market competition.9 There is strong evidence that 
hospital mergers raise prices, and much of the recent price increases 
appear concentrated in hospitals.10 Additionally, as hospitals buy 
and integrate physician practices, the bargaining (i.e., price control) 
power of private insurers continues to shrink relative to Medicare and 
Medicaid, who continue to set prices themselves. 
LIMITING THE GROWTH OF COSTS 
Any sustainable health care reform plan must consider how to 
control cost growth and set initial rates. In fee-for-service Medicare, 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) sets base 
payment rates and annual fee increases. Payments to hospitals are 
made based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), a prospective, 
capped payment for inpatient services based on a patient’s diagnosis 
and complexity. In the managed care Medicare Advantage program, 
Medicare pays private plans a capitated, risk-adjusted per-member-
per-month fee. The private plans establish networks, pay providers, 
and are ultimately responsible for most beneficiary costs. Medicare 
Advantage can control cost growth through annual payment policy 
updates, though some observers argue that Medicare Advantage 
overpays relative to fee-for-service beneficiaries.11 Medicare also 
controls spending through a variety of alternative payment models 
to control utilization and per-episode costs, such as population-
based Accountable Care Organizations and episode-based bundled 
payments.5 
State Medicaid programs set base payment rates and annual 
increases to providers and hospitals. Providers in Medicaid are paid 
through either fee-for-service or managed care arrangements, in 
which the state sets a per-enrollee capitated payment to a Medicaid 
managed care organization (MCO) to organize and deliver care.12 
Fee-for-service rates are set by Medicaid administrators, who 
typically use a percentage of Medicare’s fees or a state-developed 
fee schedule. Capitated rates to MCOs are based on those fees and 
expected utilization.13 Annual fee increases are controlled by state 
Medicaid programs, at the direction of state governments. States may 
also experiment with alternative payment models through the federal 
waiver process.
Medicaid base payment rates alone do not represent the full payment 
to providers.14 A 2017 MACPAC analysis found that in 2011, Medicaid 
fee-for-service base payment rates averaged 78% of Medicare rates.15 
Medicaid base payment rates are supplemented through other 
programs, such as the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital 
(DSH) payment, which goes to hospitals serving high proportions 
of Medicaid or low-income patients. Whether these supplemental 
payments are sufficient is a contentious issue, but a 2016 MACPAC 
analysis of disproportionate share hospitals found that total Medicaid 
payments (including supplemental payments) covered an average of 
107% of patient costs, with a range of 81% to 130% across states.16 
Private insurers, in contrast, try to control costs by negotiating directly 
with providers, and by forming networks of providers that agree 
to accept their rates. Private payers and providers may rely on the 
published Medicare rate as a benchmark during these negotiations, 
but ultimately the levels are determined by market conditions and 
relative bargaining power.17, 18
At what level should provider rates 
be set to assure access and quality of 
care, while incentivizing innovation 
and rewarding excellence?
RATE SETTING AND COST CONTROL: 
State-based Public Options 
In response to rising costs and an unclear outlook for federal health 
care reform, states have taken the lead in enacting reforms to 
provide consumers with an affordable coverage option. While these 
initiatives are new, they provide a window into how rate setting could 
work under a federal Medicare for All system. In particular, panelists 
discussed public option plans for the individual market that passed in 
Washington and were proposed in Colorado. In the debate over these 
reforms, states had to wrestle with, and decide on, how to set rates 
and control costs in a new program. 
In May 2019, Colorado Governor Jared Polis signed legislation that 
directed state officials to design a plan for a public health insurance 
option.19 State lawmakers introduced legislation (HB 1349) to create 
a Colorado Health Care Option in March 2020.20, 21 However, in 
May 2020, the bill’s sponsors announced they would withdraw the 
legislation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with the intention of re-
introducing it in 2021.22 
Under the proposed option, regulators design the insurance plan, 
including coverage requirements, premiums, and the medical loss 
ratio. Private insurers administer it through the state’s insurance 
marketplace. Hospitals in Colorado would be required to accept 
public option plans with state-mandated rates. As a result, rate setting 
was a contentious, political exercise; state officials held over a dozen 
stakeholder meetings and received hundreds of letters. The final rates 
were a political compromise to ensure that physicians, critical access 
hospitals, and providers with high shares of Medicaid and Medicare 
patients would stay financially healthy. 
Colorado’s proposed plan sets a base payment rate for all services 
at 155% of Medicare rates, with upward adjustments, including rate 
increases for critical access hospitals and providers with large shares 
of Medicaid patients, as well as incentives for efficiently managing 
costs.23 After taking these adjustments into account, the actual 
payment rate ranges from 155%-238% of Medicare, down from  
an average of 269% of Medicare rates that private insurers paid in 
2017.23, 24 As a result, the plan is expected to save consumers between 
7% and 20% on premiums, largely due to rate setting.25 
Washington took a slightly different approach to rate setting. In 
May 2019, Governor Jay Inslee signed legislation to create Cascade 
Care, a privately-administered public option for the individual 
marketplace in 2021. Similar to Colorado’s proposal, the state will 
procure subsidized plans from private health insurers. As in Colorado, 
residents can use Affordable Care Act subsidies to purchase the plan. 
However, as hospitals and physician practices face financial strains due 
to COVID-19, there has been renewed pushback against the proposal 
and requests to delay its implementation.26
To control costs, Washington set an aggregate spending cap of 160% 
of what Medicare would pay for the same set of services, excluding 
prescription drugs. However, for critical access and sole community 
hospitals, there is a “floor” of at least 101% of private allowable costs 
(i.e., private negotiated rates). For primary care providers, payments 
must be at least 135% of Medicare rates.27 In effect, many primary 
care providers and critical access hospitals will have minimal changes 
in payment rates. Unlike Colorado, which sets rates for each service, 
Washington does not specify a cap for each service. Rather, the 
aggregate cap averages total costs across all services provided and 
allows insurers the flexibility to negotiate individual rates to meet the 
benchmark.28 
Additionally, hospitals are not compelled to participate in 
Washington’s public option, as they would be in Colorado. This  
may have decreased hospital opposition to rate setting, but the 
tradeoff is greater risk that insurers will not be able to build out 
adequate provider networks. It is too early to tell how these different 
approaches will affect the affordability and accessibility of care in 
public option plans. 
Legislators in Washington and Colorado have attempted to blend 
both private and public approaches to rate setting and cost control. 
Minimum and maximum per-service and aggregate payments are set 
as a multiple of Medicare rates (like many Medicaid programs), but 
the actual negotiation of those rates and establishment of networks is 
left to insurers, akin to Medicare Advantage. 
State legislators also explored how to build on alternative payment 
models when designing rates and ensuring adequate network size. 
Colorado’s proposal mandated participation by hospitals, which is 
similar to how hospitals and doctors generally have no choice but to 
accept fee-for-service Medicare. Washington, in contrast, is relying 
on private insurers to establish adequate networks. In both cases, 
rates had to be set well above the existing Medicare fee schedule. 
Both states require state agencies or insurers to promote value-based 
insurance design, but the specific mechanisms to do so are vague. 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR RATE SETTING 
What can we learn from these state experiences in setting payment 
rates for a public option? Because these plans have yet to launch, we 
do not yet know the extent to which they produce adequate networks, 
are attractive to consumers, and control costs for consumers and state 
budgets. Nevertheless, the process of rate setting did generate some 
insights. 
First, state governments created public options without overhauling 
the existing system. Both Washington and Colorado’s plans leveraged 
the existing state-based marketplaces and relied on private insurers 
to administer plans. While both states faced considerable pressure 
from hospitals and physicians’ groups to not set rates too low (i.e., at 
the current Medicare level), political leadership was able to see the 
process through to final passage in Washington State and gain strong 
support in Colorado. 
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However, to move public options towards the finish line, policymakers 
had to set baseline rates higher than the current Medicare fee 
schedule, though they are not necessarily as generous as private 
insurers. This is likely a product of both political realities, and for some 
providers, economic necessity. 
Additionally, state public option plans had to make adjustments for 
different types of providers. In the context of national Medicare for 
All, this may require higher rates based on hospital teaching status, 
research focus, and pre-existing market share to avoid severe fiscal 
shocks—to name a few. For example, many safety-net hospitals would 
be unable to operate without supplemental DSH payments to cover 
shortfalls from Medicaid and uninsured patients. A relatively tight 
range of payment rates may reduce the incentives for health care 
systems to invest in biomedical, clinical, and operations research. No 
state has contended with how to incentivize scientific research as part 
of rate setting. How those—and other—supplemental payments would 
interact with public option rates remains an open question. 
Developing a national health care reform plan would involve a similar 
back and forth with stakeholders in the health system. On the one 
hand, reform efforts will likely fail without stakeholder input, for both 
political and administrative reasons. On the other hand, it is important 
that government rate setting does not entrench the problems it is 
seeking to reform. The U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) finds that some medical societies (such as surgeons) may 
have outsized influence in setting Medicare rates.29 One panelist put 
the issue succinctly: “[e]ntrenched interests really dictate how policy is 
written…we can’t seem to bring the health care sector under control in 
the way that we would like.” 
Finally, layered on top of the discussion of rates is the reality that the 
health care system is shifting towards alternative payment models, such 
as bundles, ACOs, and other pay-for-performance mechanisms. These 
models range from modest quality bonuses built on a fee-for-service 
chassis to population-based, capitated programs. Many of these 
models do not approach cost control through rate setting. Rather, they 
set targets for cost and quality and put financial risk on providers for 
hitting those benchmarks. Some of these payment reforms have begun 
to yield reduced costs with either neutral or positive impacts on quality, 
while others have had little impact thus far.30-32  
A few states have also implemented payment alternatives that a 
Medicare for All plan would need to consider. Maryland, for example, 
has a longstanding all-payer rate setting system.33 More recently, the 
state implemented a global budget for hospitals that caps annual 
cost growth.34 In the future, to reap the benefits of these payment 
experiments, a Medicare for All program would have to carefully 
incorporate elements of the current alternative payment landscape. 
Policymakers must consider how a national public option or single-
payer program would preserve or enhance innovative experiments 
that go beyond adjusting payment rates for specific services. 
HOW FEDERAL REFORMS STACK UP
How have policymakers approached rate setting and cost control 
in recent legislative and campaign proposals for national health 
care reforms? In Congress, national single-payer proposals from 
Senator Sanders and Representative Jayapal require Medicare to 
set a fee schedule similar to current Medicare rates. These plans also 
rely on global hospital budgets set by the government to control 
overall spending. Both plans update how fees are set and introduce 
mechanisms for some negotiations between the government and 
providers, but in general, they would shift nearly all provider payment 
much closer to current Medicare rates.35 
Proposals focused on creating a public option, such as the Center  
for American Progress’ (CAP) “Medicare Extra” plan and  
Bennet-Kaine-Delgado’s “Medicare-X” plan, have similar approaches 
to rate setting, in that they assume that a new public option would 
have to pay above current Medicare rates. In the case of Medicare 
Extra, rates would be set at the average of Medicare, Medicaid, and 
commercial insurance rates, with adjustments in favor of primary 
care. The Center for American Progress estimates this would result 
in payment rates of 108% and 132% of Medicare rates for physicians 
and hospitals, respectively.36 The Medicare-X proposal allows the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish reimbursement 
rates up to 125% of Medicare rates for services in underserved areas, 
but otherwise relies on the existing fee schedule.35 
While most plans put forward during the 2020 Democratic primary 
did not propose specific fee schedules, they all relied on Medicare’s 
ability to set rates. As in his Congressional proposal, Senators 
Sanders argued for a national health care budget to control costs, 
with payments based on current Medicare rates. Senator Warren’s 
plan proposed paying providers higher than Medicare (though the 
specific rates were not given), and suggested those rates would be 
much closer to Medicare’s fee schedule than private insurance rates.37 
Former Vice President Biden’s public option offers little detail on 
rate setting, but it indicates that it “[w]ill reduce costs for patients 
by negotiating lower prices from hospitals and other health care 
providers.”38 
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Entrenched interests really dictate 
how policy is written … we can’t seem 
to bring the health care sector under 
control in the way that we would like. 
These proposals differ from recent state experiences, in which 
private insurers set up networks and negotiate rates for publicly 
sponsored plans. While state regulators set guidelines for rates, the 
implementation was left to insurers. Additionally, states found rate 
setting to be politically contentious, and it is not clear that current 
national proposals would easily pass if payment rates were near 
current Medicare levels. 
CONCLUSION
Controlling health care spending and careful approaches to rate 
setting are key to the success of any national health care reform effort. 
Many Medicare for All proposals at the federal level leave these 
crucial questions unanswered. 
Recent state experiences with a public option show that base rates 
had to be set higher than current Medicare rates, with a highly diverse 
set of adjustments based on provider types. Some federal proposals 
assume rates can be far closer to current Medicare fees. Current 
proposals differ in the extent to which they acknowledge the need for 
higher rates and specific adjustments, such as rate enhancements for 
primary care and rural hospitals. For reasons of both economic and 
political feasibility, far more work remains to be done.
Additionally, policymakers will need to incorporate successful 
value-based payment strategies into rate setting decisions in public 
plans. While many value-based programs are relatively new, it will be 
important to build in the flexibility to include value-based payments as 
evidence of their effectiveness mounts. 
Finally, policymakers will have to consider the current state of 
hospital finances, especially during and following the significant 
financial challenges hospitals have faced in the ongoing response to 
COVID-19. As panelists noted, some hospitals might not survive if 
the payer mix rapidly shifted to Medicare at existing rates. Moving 
from current proposals to realistic policy will entail accounting for 
varying levels of provider consolidation, existing hospital margins, and 
incentives for innovation.
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Policymakers will have to consider the 
current state of hospital finances, especially 
during and following the significant 
challenges hospitals have faced in the 
ongoing response to COVID-19.
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